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Abstract 
The impact of H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law on modern legal thinking is undisputed. But 
does it reflect the reality of the way British institutions work? In Concept, Hart argued, 
amongst other things, that one of two ‘minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the 
existence of a legal system’ was that ‘its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal 
validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public 
standards of official behaviour by its officials’. In this paper, we begin the process of testing 
that statement empirically. Specifically, we ask whether non-judicial UK officials have a 
uniform view of what the rules of recognition, change and adjudication are, and whether they 
uniformly take an internal point of view towards them (ie whether they accept the rules, and 
do not merely obey them). By way of a pilot study, 30 non-judicial UK officials were 
interviewed. Those officials comprised currently serving and retired senior civil servants, 
senior military officials, chief constables and local authority chief executives. The findings of 
the pilot study are presented in this paper. They allow us to deduce that Hart’s statement might 
well be an inaccurate and incomplete description of the modern British constitution, and to 
comment on the implications of that conclusion. 
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H.L.A. Hart’s The Concept of Law plays a central role in modern legal thought (e.g. Endicott, 
2013). The literature on it is now enormous.1 It forms part of the mental apparatus of lawyers 
educated not only in the United Kingdom but also throughout the English-speaking world and 
beyond.2 In it Hart attempts, as he himself remarked later, ‘to say something about law in 
general, [something that] has . . . some claim to universality and . . . not to be evaluative 
or justificatory, but descriptive’ (Hart and Sugarman, 2005, p. 287). That ‘something’ most 
notably included an account of law that separated it from morality. But it also included an 
account of law’s relationship with politics. It is that relationship that this article takes up 
and challenges. 
Hart argued in Concept that one of two ‘minimum conditions necessary and sufficient 
for the existence of a legal system’ was that ‘its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of 
legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common 
public standards of official behaviour by its officials’ (Hart, 2012, p. 116).3 The rules of 
recognition of a legal system establish which rules count as part of the system and which do 
not. The rules of change lay down how the rules in the system can be altered. The rules of 
adjudication lay down which people or institutions settle issues of how the rules in the system 
                                                 
1 Nearly 12,000 citations are linked in Google Scholar, around the same as Richard Posner’s Economic Analysis 
of Law. Of the ‘major’ jurisprudential texts, only Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously with around 13,000 citations 
seems more cited (checked 12 October 2015). 
2 Hart’s work featured, for example, in R (Miller and Dos Santos) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union [2017] UKSC 5, the UK’s single most significant constitutional case for many years, at [60], [173] and 
[223]-[227]. See also, e.g. R (Jackson) v. Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56at [126]; Pham v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19 at [80]; Kable v. Director of Public Prosecutions of New South Wales 
(1996) 189 CLR 51 at 74; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v. State of Victoria [2002] CLR 
422 at 443 and 446; R v. Buzzacott (2004) 149 A Crim R 320 (Supreme Court of the ACT); and Motard c. Canada 
(Procureure Générale) 2016 QCCS 588. Hart’s influence on courts and practitioners in the USA is perhaps not 
as extensive, and his influence is mainly as an academic counterpoint to Dworkin and to Lon Fuller (Schauer, 
2006) but see Sourbeer v Robinson 791 F.2d. 1094 (US Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 1986). 
3 The other necessary minimum condition was that ‘those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the 
system’s ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed’: Hart, 2012, p. 116. 
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apply in specific instances. Those rules, Hart’s ‘secondary rules’, form a crucial part of Hart’s 
theory that the way to understand law is as the union of primary and secondary rules. But, in 
addition, Hart’s account includes a claim that the continuing existence of the legal system 
results from state officials holding a common view of those secondary rules and holding that 
view in a particular way, the ‘internal point of view’. Hart’s argument is that unless state 
officials hold a common view of the secondary rules and hold it from an internal point of view, 
the system will send out contradictory instructions to the population and thus will be in danger 
of losing both legitimacy and effectiveness (Hart, 2012, p. 116. See also Goldsworthy, 2001, 
pp. 240-242). The system will, in Kramer’s vocabulary, lose ‘operativeness’ (Kramer, 2013, p. 
45).4 
Hart’s account is undoubtedly interesting and fruitful. One obvious question about it, 
however, seems not previously to have been asked. Is it true? Do officials in fact hold a 
common view of the secondary rules from an internal point of view? This paper reports on the 
results of a study, admittedly a small scale and exploratory pilot study, that suggests that the 
answer might eventually turn out to be ‘no’.  
 
I. Hart’s claim – a uniform internal point of view 
Hart’s claim, to be more specific, is that it is ‘crucial . . . that there should be a unified or shared 
official acceptance of the rule of recognition’ (Hart, 2012, p. 115). That idea breaks down into 
two elements, that officials should have a shared view of the secondary rules and that they 
should ‘accept’ those rules. The first element is reasonably clear. ‘As a guide’, Hart says, 
officials’ view of the secondary rules has to be ‘uniform’ (Hart, 2012, p. 258 and see also pp. 
266-267: ‘the rule of recognition is treated in my book as resting on a conventional form of 
                                                 
4 The issue of whether lack of ‘operativeness’ means that a legal system no longer ‘exists’ is a separate question. 
Certain writers assert that even a legal system the population at large completely ignores can still ‘exist’: see 
Tamanaha, 2001, pp. 145-147. Such a situation is possibly better described as a factitious legal system. 
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judicial consensus’). For a legal system to persist, the rules of recognition, adjudication and 
change accepted by officials have to be the same rules, uniformly interpreted. That is because 
otherwise the system will generate contradictory instructions to the population at large.  
The second element, acceptance, is less clear. Hart distinguished between the external 
and internal aspects of following a rule. The external aspect of rules concerns what can be 
observed by others – the extent to which behaviour appears to conform to the rule. The internal 
aspect relates to a person’s attitude towards the rules, in particular whether they understand and 
accept them (Hart, 2012, p. 60). Hart claims that a difference exists between ordinary citizens 
and officials in what is required of them. External following of the rules is required of both, 
but taking the internal point of view is required only of officials (Hart, 2012, pp. 116-117). 
This is not simply a matter of having to be an expert to understand the rules (Hart, 2012, p. 60). 
Understanding the rules is not enough. Hart is concerned with something else: 
 
‘[P]rivate citizens . . . may obey each “for his part only” and from any motive whatever . . . 
[Officials] must regard these as common standards of official behaviour and appraise critically 
their own and each other’s deviations as lapses’ (Hart, 2012, pp. 116-117). 
 
The most straightforward explanation for this requirement is that officials correcting 
one another in cases of non-compliance helps to maintain uniformity. The point of view is 
‘internal’ in the sense that it is used in the internal social interaction among officials.5 No 
similar need exists for the general public to accept the secondary rules presumably because 
Hart thinks that no confusion about which rules are authoritative can arise from variation in the 
views of non-officials.6 In an extreme case, Hart says, the internal point of view might be 
                                                 
5 Hart’s position on this issue in his Postscript is essentially the same. He continued to refer to acceptance (and 
not mere obedience) by officials and to insist that such acceptance is essential for the ‘existence and authority of 
the rule of recognition’: Hart, 2012, p. 250. 
6 This is not expressly stated, but seems to follow from Hart, 2012, p. 116. 
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confined exclusively to officials – producing a society, he comments, that might be ‘deplorably 
sheeplike’ (Hart, 2012, p. 117) and ‘the sheep might end in the slaughter-house’ but one which 
would still have ‘a legal system’. 
It makes no difference, however, why officials use the rules as standards to criticise 
other officials. Officials need not accept the secondary rules through feeling ‘morally bound to 
do so’, although, Hart goes on to say, ‘the system will be most stable when they do so’ (Hart, 
2012, p. 203). He continued: 
 
‘[T]heir allegiance to the system may be based on many different considerations: calculations 
of long-term interest; disinterested interest in others; an unreflecting inherited or traditional 
attitude; or the mere wish to do as others do. There is indeed no reason why those who accept 
the authority of the system should not examine their conscience and decide that, morally, they 
ought not to accept it, yet for a variety of reasons continue to do so’ (Hart, 2012, p. 203). 
 
The internal point of view is not ‘internal’ in the sense of being related to one’s deepest 
convictions or in the sense of ‘authentic’. An official who disapproves of the constitution 
maintains the internal point of view by refraining from making that disapproval public. 
Successful simulation of approval is just as much taking the internal point of view as 
enthusiastic endorsement.7 
 
II. Preliminary objections 
Two sorts of objection might immediately be made to a project of investigating whether Hart’s 
claim is true. First, is Hart’s claim really empirical? Although Hart famously characterised 
                                                 
7 These passages have resulted in some puzzlement, especially since subsequently Hart adopted Raz’s view that 
it is possible to put forward propositions of law in a ‘committed’ or a ‘detached’ way (or in Kramer’s vocabulary, 
to distinguish between the ‘internal’ and the ‘simulative’). But the essential point is whether the official is 
contributing to or detracting from the maintenance of uniformity. 
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Concept as an exercise in ‘descriptive sociology’ (Hart, 2012, p. vi), he later regretted it (Lacey, 
2006, p. 949). Instead, one can read it as a purely philosophical work, arguing for a view of 
what law must be, not of what it happens to be. Nevertheless, as John Gardner points out, Hart 
in his unfinished Postscript to the book continued to insist that his work was ‘descriptive’ 
(Gardner, 2012, p. 275, discussing Hart, 1994). In particular, Hart says he is providing a 
description of others’ practices and, and although that description involves interpretation of 
those practices in a ‘hermeneutic’ sense (Hart, 1983, pp. 13-14),8 it does not draw him into 
evaluating them (Hart, 2012, pp. 239-244). That remains the case, says Hart, even though the 
practices themselves might be evaluative.  
Gardner raises a different version of this objection. He says Hart’s theory, regardless of 
what Hart intended, cannot be empirical. Gardner claims that one has to know what law is 
before one can make empirical statements about it. Hart’s theory is about what law is. It tells 
us what to look for if we want to make empirical statements about law. Thus it must be prior 
to those empirical statements (Gardner, 2012). The problem with Gardner’s objection is that it 
makes a claim very difficult to justify about the relationship between philosophy and empirical 
sociology. A social phenomenon does not need to make philosophical sense for it to be a 
possible object of empirical study. If, for example, people use the word ‘law’ in many different 
and incompatible ways, that is an empirical fact we can report without needing the permission 
of philosophers to use the word ‘law’. No doubt sociologists can benefit from philosophical 
reflection about their methods, and the concepts at the heart of their methods do have to be 
coherent. But that is very different from claiming that the objects of empirical study must make 
sense.  
                                                 
8 Rejecting what Hart calls the ‘empirical’ approach of the Scandinavian realists. In sociology as practised by, for 
example, Max Weber, however, no contradiction exists between being interpretive and being empirical. Indeed, 
even in the supposedly non-interpretive sociology of the Durkheimian tradition, in sharp contrast with the rather 
crude materialism of the Scandinavian realists, what makes empirical sociology possible is the existence of 
specifically social facts. 
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A more refined and powerful version of Gardner’s point, however, is that Hart was 
engaged neither in a purely philosophical forging of concepts nor in empirical study but in a 
third activity, that of constructing out of existing social practices concepts for use in future 
empirical study. Hart remarked, ‘What I should have said is that it provides the tools for 
descriptive sociology, not that it is descriptive sociology’ (Hart and Sugarman, 2005, p. 291). 
Denis Galligan has pointed out the striking similarity between Hart’s method of drawing upon 
existing social practices, specifically those around creating and following rules, to develop his 
‘concept’ of law and Max Weber’s method of ideal types (Galligan, 2015). Weber’s ideal types 
are analytically useful constructs built out of one-sided accentuations of existing social 
practices to help the observer understand social action (Weber, 1949, p. 90). The parallel is not 
exact since Weber’s ideal types are not required to be philosophically coherent, only ‘adequate 
at the level of meaning’ – that is, make sense at the level of the individual whose actions they 
help the observer to understand. Consequently, ideal types can encompass inconsistent and 
‘irrational’ action, not just ‘rational’ action (Weber, 1978, pp. 19-22). Hart, in contrast, 
strenuously tries to make his concepts coherent. Also, whereas Weber, having constructed a 
set of ideal types, would then compare them with the empirical world, the better to understand 
that world through a process of assessing where the ideal types work and where they fail to 
work, Hart only carries out the first phase. He constructs an ideal type or ‘concept’ but does 
not go on to apply it.  
If this account of Hart is correct, and it certainly more than plausible, the project 
proposed in this paper should be taken as a contribution to supplying Hart’s concept with its 
missing second phase. It applies Hart’s concept, his ideal type of officials, to some of the 
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empirical facts to see to what extent it explains those facts.9 If the concept does not explain all 
of the empirical facts, the concept, and not the facts, will need stand in need of revision. 
 The second objection to our project is that, although certain well-known examples exist 
of UK judges musing about whether they will always accept the doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy,10 no evidence appears in their judgments that they accept anything else,11 still less 
that they disagree about the power of parliament to change the law or their own right to 
adjudicate on what the law is. One might be able to tease out subtle differences about, for 
example, how the law might change through common law adjudication or the extent to which 
courts’ deference to other decision-makers involves an abrogation of their own powers to 
adjudicate, but ultimately these are minor differences of little practical importance. The 
objection is therefore that too little variation exists for any such empirical study to be 
interesting.  
But even if that is so, what judges believe does not exhaust what ‘officials’ believe. 
What about civil servants, military officers, police officers or local government officials? What 
do these officials believe to be the rules of recognition, adjudication and change? Do they treat 
them as common public standards? It is potentially just as destructive to stability to receive 
contradictory instructions from civil servants, military officers, police officers or local 
government officers as from judges. These are, as far as we know, questions never before asked 
and ones where variation in the answers is entirely possible given that other researchers have 
                                                 
9 One should note that although ideal types cannot be refuted by empirical evidence they can be shown to be 
‘inadequate’, either because they explain too little to be worth bothering with or because they make no sense at 
the level of the individual. That distinguishes the ideal type approach from another argument that undermines not 
only any empirical investigation of Hart’s claim but also the claim itself. This is the possibility that Hart’s claim 
is unfalsifiable because whatever evidence of lack of uniformity or of the internal point of view one might 
discover, proponents of Hart’s view might say that because the legal system is still functioning in some way, the 
degree of lack of uniformity and of the internal point of view cannot have been enough to affect the ‘operativeness’ 
of the system. This reduces Hart’s claim from a causal claim to a meaningless play on words. 
10 For example, R (on the application of Jackson) v. Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56; AXA General Insurance 
Limited and others v. The Lord Advocate and others [2011] UKSC 46. 
11 See, for example, R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd) v. Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, where Lord 
Reed, with whom the other six Justices agreed, was ‘mindful of the importance of refraining from trespassing 
upon the province of Parliament or, so far as possible, even appearing to do so’ (at [95]). 
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found that our executive consists not of a ‘compact monolith, but a loosely structured 
conglomerate’ (Daintith and Page, 1999, p. 8. See also Bevir and Rhodes, 2010, p. 198). This 
study therefore starts to investigate the views of non-judicial officials – senior civil servants, 
senior military officers, chief constables and local government chief executives – about Hart’s 
secondary rules.12 In 1999, Daintith and Page made great strides in addressing the ‘long-term 
neglect’ of the executive as a subject of academic study (Daintith and Page, 1999, p. 1). As 
they correctly observed, it is ‘bizarre’ to overlook the constitutional importance of the 
executive branch (Daintith and Page, 1999, p. 2. An in-depth study of the executive in the 
context of making delegated legislation was carried out in Page, 2001). This study seeks to add 
to the correction of that omission. 
An objection to studying non-judicial officials might be that their views are not 
important for the existence of a legal system or for understanding constitutional law. Our view, 
however, is that in constitutional law, as in many areas of law, the courts play a very limited 
role. In private law, contracts are drafted, concluded and carried out all the time without judges 
getting anywhere near them; companies are formed and operated on the basis of their founding 
documents without any help from the High Court. Similarly in public law, regulations on 
myriads of topics are applied, both by government agencies and by private parties (the latter 
often applying the law to themselves) without any court pronouncing on how they should be 
interpreted. If one wants to know how the law operates in these fields, one has to look at how 
it is applied every day in reality. Indeed, the appearance of a court decision involving UK 
constitutional law is an event rare enough to be commented upon for its very existence, and yet 
                                                 
12 One might also ask what views ministers themselves might have about these topics. We have, however, 
excluded ministers at this stage. We do not intend by this to imply that ministers are not crucial players in the 
executive branch of government. They plainly are. It is simply that a finding that politicians disagreed about Hart’s 
secondary rules or failed to take the internal point of view towards them would be too easy to dismiss as 
unsurprising and unimportant: unsurprising because constitutional issues are part of politics and unimportant 
because, outside Parliament, ministers have little capacity to act except through their officials. Confining ourselves 
to officials is to take on a harder case to prove than if we had included ministers and thus, we hope, potentially 
more persuasive in its results. 
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the constitutional system operates every working day. As Yong has noted, if we only study the 
courts and Parliament, we cannot see ‘how the Executive regulates itself internally’ (Yong, 
2013, para. 1.4). If one wants to know how the constitution works, one needs to know the views 
of the officials who operate it.  
The seniority of the officials is, nevertheless, important (see Goldsworthy, 2001, p. 238, 
n. 4). They are in a position to affect the ‘operativeness’ of the system from the top down. 
Cabinet secretaries, permanent secretaries, chiefs of the defence staff and senior generals 
control considerable resources and, more important for our purposes, act as gatekeepers 
between political leaders and effective power, that is between political decisions being taken 
and citizens being given instructions about what to do or how to do things. The scope of 
investigation should also extend to the views of chief constables and local authority chief 
executives, officials who, although limited in terms of geographical jurisdiction, are subject to 
no administrative superiors and who also act as gatekeepers between politics and effective 
power. 
Admittedly it is possible that ‘street level bureaucrats’, those charged with the exercise 
of discretion in individual cases, might be able to restore the operativeness of the system at the 
bottom, by incorporating into their decisions values and judgments from beyond the law or by 
selective inattention to it, constructing coherence out of incoherence (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-
Moody and Portillo, 2010, pp. 253-277 especially at pp. 269-270; Mashaw, 1983; Howarth, 
1992, pp. 29-53 deriving from Garfinkel, 1967, pp. 76-103). But a situation in which senior 
officials differ about fundamental questions of authority would pose a much bigger challenge 
for lower level officials than the usual problem they face of individual policies being unclear 
or incomplete. Each gap in a policy or each unclear statutory provision affects only a subset, 
usually a small subset of lower level officials, so that one can see how a common street level 
view might emerge (even though divergence is also a distinct possibility). Constitutional 
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incoherence, however, would be more difficult to confine to small subsets of officials. For 
lower level officials to be able to restore constitutional coherence one would have to imagine 
a situation in which they all shared a single understanding of the constitution and that shared 
single understanding was unaffected by the views of senior officials. That is possible, but, we 
believe, unlikely.13 
Objectors might come back with the argument that even these very senior appliers of 
the law are themselves subject to the courts and so their views are ultimately subordinate to 
those of judges. That argument, however, assumes too much. Although other actors might be 
aware of the possibility of judicial intervention, it is an empirical matter whether that possibility 
makes any difference to how they act. Even in terms of public perception and ultimate loyalties, 
it is not obvious a priori whether, were a conflict to break out between the courts and non-
judicial officials about the most basic rules of the constitution, the public would side with the 
judges.14 
A mirror-image objection might be to claim the law does not much matter for the 
operativeness of government. Where government operates through contracting out, for 
example, the legal enforceability of the relevant contracts might matter less for whether they 
are carried out than long-term reciprocal relationships between the parties. Where government 
                                                 
13 A further possibility, perhaps for future development, is that the separation of government into separate siloes 
operates to contain and mitigate the effects of incoherence at the centre. As long as incoherence derived from 
other siloes can be ignored and citizens fail to notice the interactions between the siloes, the system can still at 
least appear to function. This perhaps explains both calls for ‘joined-up government’ (because of instances when 
citizens do notice cross-silo incoherence) and why it is so difficult to achieve. 
14 Another preliminary objection is to ask how, without knowing the law, can we say that a particular person is an 
official? Just as Gardner argues that one has to know what counts as law before making empirical statements about 
law, is it not also the case that we cannot tell which persons are officials without knowing the law that makes them 
officials? Hart himself has been accused of ‘circularity’ on this point – officials only exist because of the rule of 
recognition, but the rule of recognition only exists because the officials conform to it (see Leslie Green’s notes in 
Hart, 2012, p. 316; MacCormick, 2008, p. 34 and pp. 136-137). The problem is not just an epistemic one of the 
kind ‘how do we know whether someone is an official?’ but also an ontological one of the kind ‘who counts as 
an official?’ One could spend a very great amount of time on such questions (See e.g. Searle, 1995, ch. 2.) The 
question for the present study, however, is merely whether the fact that Hart himself proposed no solution to the 
circularity problem poses a threat to the project of testing Hart’s theory empirically. We would maintain that it 
does not. It might be a threat if the people we identified as officials turned out not to be officials according to law, 
since then we would have been studying to the wrong people. Nothing, however, indicates that those we studied 
were anything but duly appointed to their offices. 
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operates through co-ordinating its activities with those of other organisations, that is where 
‘governance’ operates through ‘policy networks’ (Rhodes, 1997; Rhodes, 2007), its 
relationships with those other organisations might have no legal force at all. But Hart is not 
interested in government (or ‘governance’) in general. He is interested the legal system. 
Admittedly if the legal system were completely ineffective, questions about how it worked 
would be of no interest, but it would be surprising if theorists who point to other ways in which 
government operates were making such an extreme claim.15 
One final objection is that no matter how inherently interesting the views of non-judicial 
officials are, studying them will give us no purchase on Hart’s views, because when Hart 
referred to ‘officials’ he meant only ‘judges’. This interpretation is, however, inconsistent with 
the text of Concept. Hart himself referred numerous times to ‘courts or other officials’ (Hart, 
2012, p. 101).16 In fact, Hart’s own usage seems deliberately wider than ordinary usage, not 
narrower. At one stage, for example, Hart says ‘laws . . . give powers to officials, e.g. to a judge 
to try cases, to a minister to make rules, or a county council to make by-laws’ (Hart, 2012, p. 
26).17 Given Hart’s own text and the breadth of his own usage, we can be reasonably sure that 
when he said that it is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a legal system 
that ‘officials’ accept rules of recognition, change and adjudication, he was not exempting non-
judicial officials (see also Goldsworthy, 2001, pp. 240-241). Of course, other writers, in 
                                                 
15 The ontological issue referred to above in note 14 also lurks behind this objection. If ‘government’ is a legal 
concept, there is an irreducible legal element in talk about ‘government’ acting through contract or policy 
networks. Political scientists tend to assert that Britain has never adopted the theory of the Rechtsstaat, denying 
the very existence of a state outside the law, but as the ambiguity of Hart’s own theory illustrates, it might be 
better for our purposes to treat the issue as unresolved.  
16 See also, for example, p 2: ‘official or . . . court’; p 10: ‘judge or official’; and p 67: ‘courts, officials. . .’. 
17 Note that the reference in this passage to County Councils justifies including local government officers within 
the category of officials. For the inclusion of the police, see Hart, 2012, pp. 20 and 39. It is also worth mentioning 
that to call a judge ‘an official’ is itself mildly controversial – judges might see themselves as ‘officers’ of the 
state but in British English, in which the usual meaning of the word ‘official’ is ‘civil servant’, calling them 
‘officials’ makes them sound as if they are subordinate to politicians. Counting ministers as ‘officials’ is also not 
ordinary British English. The category of ‘elected official’ is American. In Britain the categories ‘official’ and 
‘politician’ are usually thought mutually exclusive. In his introduction to the third edition of Concept, Green even 
says that Hart intended to include legislators within his definition of ‘officials’, which would go even further 
beyond ordinary British usage (Hart, 2012, p. xxix).  
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particular Joseph Raz, have sought to restrict the relevant set of ‘officials’ to judges, but Hart 
himself, we believe, did not.18 
 
III. A pilot study 
With these preliminaries out of the way, we can now turn to how we might investigate Hart’s 
claim empirically. The hypothesis we want ultimately to test is that UK non-judicial officials 
adhere to a uniform internal point of view towards the UK’s rules of recognition, adjudication 
and change. That means (1) having a uniform view of what those rules are and (2) uniformly 
taking an internal point of view towards them.  
Both questions involve issues of interpretation and nuance. It is not the case that only 
one way exists of stating the same rule. A difference in the precise formulation of a rule does 
not entail a difference about the content of the rule. Similarly, agreement about a verbal 
formulation does not in itself entail uniformity in how it is applied. In addition, the hypothesis 
we want to test is not that officials agree with a specific formulation of the rules of recognition, 
adjudication and change but that they hold the same view of those rules as one another, 
whatever view that is. As a result, a method that imposed or presupposed ‘correct’ views of the 
rules would be inappropriate. Officials need to be able to speak for themselves.  
                                                 
18 Raz distinguished between ‘norm-creating’ and ‘norm-applying’ institutions and among the latter between 
‘primary’ institutions, such as courts, and other institutions, such as the police, with only the ‘primary’ institutions 
claiming an essential role in a legal system (Raz, 1979, pp. 105-110). At one point Raz claims that it is not only 
in his own view but also ‘presumably’ Hart’s view that ‘official’ means only a ‘primary norm-applying’ official 
(Raz, 1979, p. 92), (see also Green’s Notes to Hart, 2012, p. 317). But Hart himself refers not to law ‘applying’ 
officials but to law ‘identifying’ officials, which he does not restrict to courts (see ‘Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity 
of Law’ in Hart, 1983, pp. 335-337).  
Raz’s view itself, one might mention in passing, seems to leave civil servants as non-primary law-applying 
officials, alongside the police. That seems a very thin view of the role of senior civil servants in a modern state. 
The law they apply in their everyday work is not enforcement of existing rules but is rather law that refers to 
themselves and usually concerns their own powers. The modern ‘executive’ does rather more than ‘execute’ the 
law. Raz’s view might work for identifying the minimal conditions for identifying a ‘legal system’ for 
anthropological purposes, but one might question whether it meets Hart’s objective of ensuring that citizens do 
not face contradictory rules. 
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All this suggests that the appropriate method for approaching the question is qualitative 
and interactive. For our pilot study, we chose to carry out semi-structured interviews, using a 
standard series of prompts but allowing conversations to develop around them.19 The prompts 
themselves consisted of putting to respondents two or three recent examples of UK 
constitutional rules coming under stress.20 We chose to use specific real-life examples of 
problems of recognition, change and adjudication, rather than to address those issues abstractly, 
for two reasons: first, just as in the case method of legal education, at least when done well, 
discussion of specific cases is less likely than abstract discussion to elicit merely formulaic 
‘acceptable’ answers; and secondly, as in behavioural interviewing of candidates for jobs, 
information elicited from examples in the interviewees’ own experience and knowledge are 
likely to be a better guide to behaviour than purely hypothetical situations. 
The main risk of this method is that the specificity of the examples might draw attention 
away from important ideas and practices not relevant in those situations but relevant in other 
                                                 
19 The standard caveats about semi-structured interviews should be given: variation in the order in which points 
were made or in the wording of questions is inevitable and might have had effects on responses; especially since 
building rapport with the interviewee is an important part of the process, interviewers can unconsciously give out 
cues about ‘preferred’ answers; because no controls are made for other factors, there is no certainty that a 
respondent would give the same response on another day; and coding is difficult because interviewees are always 
in effect answering different questions. In addition, in interpreting the results, researchers should remember that 
interviewees might not be telling the truth, might not understand their own motivations and might not act in 
accordance with their own beliefs about what they should do. Cf Bevir and Rhodes, 2010, pp. 156-157: ‘They can 
be candid statements, expressions of self-interest, or exercises in myth making. There are always the questions of 
how to interpret the data, and the extent to which their expressed views shaped their own practices and the practices 
of others.’ One can sometimes cross-check what interviewees say using publicly available sources 
(autobiographies for example) but those sources often suffer from similar problems and in any case officials of 
the kind we are here interested in very rarely write autobiographies or even give on the record interviews. For an 
exception see Peter Hennessey’s interviews of Cabinet Secretaries at <http://www.cabinetsecretaries.com/> (last 
accessed 1 May 2016), quite appropriately headed ‘Men of Secrets’. Little or nothing emerges in those interviews 
on the issues we are here studying. Another possible cross-check would be direct observation of officials at work. 
The problems of access for this kind of ethnography are, however, considerable and the resources required to do 
it across government would be substantial. We content ourselves at this point to asking whether our results are 
compatible with those of previous ethnographic studies, e.g. those of Page, 2001 and Bevir and Rhodes, 2010. 
20 The specific prompts are given in the [Online] Appendix. Our method differs from that of Page, 2001 who 
sought to examine the workings of government by studying the more ‘day-to-day’ process because the big issues 
are ‘atypical’ (p. 16). We found that prompting our interviewees by referring to ‘big issues’ with which they were 
familiar led to them drawing analogies with smaller issues in their day-to-day work. Our method is derived 
ultimately from the case method developed by Karl Llewellyn for his study of the law of the Cheyenne: Llewellyn 
and Hoebel, 1941. We also take comfort for this approach from Bevir and Rhodes’ observations that ‘Top civil 
servants and ministers learn through the stories they hear and tell another’ and that ‘Most if not all civil servants 
will accept that the art of storytelling is an integral part of their work’: Bevir and Rhodes, 2006, p. 118.  
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cases. Asking interviewees for their own examples to some extent mitigated that risk, as did 
providing a variety of examples to each interviewee. We cannot, however, pretend that our 
method reveals the whole range of constitutional ideas and practices within government. What 
it can do, however, is to illustrate the existence of certain ideas and practices. 
One other potential risk in this method should be mentioned. In accordance with normal 
ethical principles for this kind of research, all interviewees were guaranteed anonymity. The 
specificity of the examples, however, heightens the risk that reporting their remarks might tend 
to identify them. We have endeavoured to ensure that we have not reported views in any way 
that might identify individuals. To achieve that, however, we have had to edit quotations and 
to leave out altogether some highly relevant observations and examples. 
 
3.1 Sampling issues 
Turning to our sample, invitations were sent out to current permanent secretaries and to recently 
retired officials of the same rank whose whereabouts were publicly known (thus introducing a 
slight bias in favour of those whose careers in public life had continued post-retirement, 
although we judged that there was no obvious connection between that fact and their views on 
the issues at hand). Local government chief executives from three English counties were 
invited, as were chief constables, together with a few further local government figures, from a 
slightly wider area. Some retired chief constables were also included from that wider area. 
While we accept that views on constitutional matters might have changed at least incrementally 
over time,21 so that variance might occur purely on a generational basis with no consequences 
for the functioning of the system at present, so making that a factor to take into account when 
                                                 
21 Cf Bevir and Rhodes’ concept of a ‘living traditions’ that is ‘adaptable sets of beliefs that enable those acting 
in the political sphere to understand and make sense of their world… sometimes resilient and enduring, and at 
other times ambivalent or contradictory in their core belief’: Bevir and Rhodes, 2010, p. 139. 
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interpreting the results, we have no reason to believe that views on constitutional issues vary 
geographically. 
The study was in the nature of a pilot study but we aimed to interview enough people 
to be able at least to make reasonable suggestions for future research. We interviewed 30 
people, just under 50 per cent of those we approached. Our interviewees came from a variety 
of government departments both foreign policy-related and domestic.22  
Access to senior civil servants is not easy to obtain, and might be a serious problem for 
any full-scale follow-up. Indeed, that difficulty is a principal reason for reporting the results of 
the pilot study and not waiting for a full-scale study. Our interest was in constitutional matters 
rather than matters of politics or policy but some civil servants cited the Civil Service 
Management Code 2015 paragraph 4.2.8,23 which forbids participation in research into civil 
servants’ political and policy opinions, as a reason for not being interviewed, with the result 
that we spoke to rather more retired officials than current ones. In addition, officials in one 
department, the Treasury, insisted that constitutional matters were nothing to do with them – a 
matter of interest in itself – and referred us to the Ministry of Justice and the Cabinet Office. 
As a result, if variants on the rules exist in the Treasury, which is entirely possible, we are not 
in a position to report them.  
One other possible source of bias was that one of us had previously worked in the 
vicinity of Whitehall and there was a tendency for the acceptance rate to be higher among those 
personally known to the researchers. Since the hypothesis we were testing was one of 
uniformity, we recognised that this particular bias might be a problem if uniformity did appear, 
but that if uniformity did not emerge, this aspect of the sample would strengthen the result 
rather than weaken it. 
                                                 
22 We refrain from listing the individual departments so as not to jeopardise anonymity. 
23 <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/418696/CSMC-
_April_2015.pdf> (last accessed 29 December 2015). 




3.2 Sample size 
Since we are testing a hypothesis of uniformity, a single counter-example serves to refute it. 
That means that if we find any difference between respondents, the hypothesis should be 
rejected. Sample size is therefore for this purpose not relevant, only the accuracy of the 
judgment that we have indeed found a counter-example. Statistical methods are not required 
and so, for this judgment, no issue of sampling error arises. Statistical methods and sampling 
error do become relevant, however, if the question is not whether uniformity exists but instead 
by how much reality varies from uniformity. With only 30 respondents, confident inferences 
about that issue are unlikely. We would need a bigger sample in a full-scale study. We are 
therefore inevitably vulnerable to the argument that, even though we might discover lack of 
uniformity, its degree might turn out to be not enough to threaten the operativeness of the 
system. We consider this point further below, but we concede that with this sample size and at 
this stage of the study, we are looking to establish merely whether lack of uniformity exists and 
whether further investigation is likely to be worthwhile rather than finally to establish whether 
operativeness is threatened. 
Sample size also becomes relevant in the opposite direction: how many officials do we 
have to interview before we can justifiably conclude that uniformity exists? After all, even if 
we observe a very large number of officials saying the same thing, how do we know the next 
official we might have asked would not have disagreed? The answer to this classic problem of 
induction is, of course, that we cannot know for certain. All we can do is express our uncertainty 
in terms of probabilities. Whether these probabilities are sufficient is not something that admits 
of a single answer, but we can say something about how a rational person would update their 
views given the evidence (see e.g. Jackman, 2009, p. 7). If, for example, someone who thought 
that, on the basis of the information available to them, uniformity of views on constitutional 
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issues by state officials was very unlikely – say a probability of 0.05 – and they observed a 
sequence of 30 state officials saying the same thing on a constitutional issue, something that 
would happen by chance once in a billion times, assuming a 50:50 chance of agreeing or 
disagreeing with the previous official, the observer would have to raise their probability that 
there is uniformity on the particular matter in hand to near certainty.24 
It is inherent in using semi-structured interviews that not all interviewees will have 
given useable answers on all the issues of interest.25 Where we claim that there is evidence of 
uniformity on the basis of fewer than 30 responses, we will say so. 
 
3.3 The internal point of view 
Testing the claim that officials take a uniformly internal point of view presents specific 
problems, especially if it is enough for officials successfully to give a false impression that they 
believe in the rules. The one crucial element of the internal point of view that might be 
observable, however, is whether officials comply with the law at all. If officials decide 
consciously to break the law, it is difficult to argue that they are displaying an internal point of 
view towards the system.26 Hart allows obeying the law for prudential reasons to count, because 
                                                 
24 This follows from Bayes’ Theorem with P(H)=0.05, P(E│H)=0.99 (that is the probability of the evidence if 
uniformity is true – allowing 1% for errors in interpretation) and P(E│¬H)=0.000000001 (that is the probability 
of the evidence if uniformity is not true, here set at the binomial probability on the assumption that the only other 
way this could come about is by chance – of course if there were an alternative hypothesis, this number could be 
higher and the posterior probability correspondingly lower). If the observer thinks that the probability of 
agreement with the previous official is higher than 50:50 (perhaps because of a view about the biases of those 
doing the coding or bias in the precise question being used) P(E│¬H) can be much higher. In the same example, 
if the probability of agreement is thought to be 0.9, the binomial probability is 0.04, but the posterior probability 
of uniformity still rises to 0.57. 
25 For example, if only the current and former senior civil servants we interviewed (n=16) responded to an issue, 
the corresponding binomial figures are 1.5 in a hundred thousand and 0.185, so that applying Bayes’ Theorem as 
above a very sceptical observer (prior=0.05) with a 0.9 question would if confronted with 16 positive responses 
only reach a posterior probability of 0.22, but for a 50:50 question the same very sceptical observer would reach 
near certainty. If the prior was 0.5, that is the observer thought on the basis of prior experience that the probability 
of uniformity was a 50:50 chance, the posterior even with a 0.9 question would be 0.84. 
26 Cases of officials breaking the law have been reported in other jurisdictions, although not at the level studied 
here. For example, Davis described various instances of American police officers modifying or nullifying 
gambling or jaywalking laws: Davis, 1971, pp. 84-96. This led him to remark provocatively that ‘The law for 
Chicago is not what the legislature enacts; it is what the police chief says to the newspapers’: p. 85. 
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that will contribute to stability, but disobeying for prudential reasons has an entirely different 
effect on the ‘operativeness’ of the law. If we accept that taking the internal point of view is 
important because those who take it will correct other officials who appear to be straying from 
the common line, it is important that an official who openly disobeys or disregards the law is 
in no position to criticise others for acting in a similar manner. The credibility of such an official 
as a stabilising influence will be compromised.27 In contrast, an official who refuses to follow 
an unlawful instruction will invariably be involved in at least implicitly criticising those who 
gave the instruction and so will be displaying the internal point of view.28 We therefore asked 
our interviewees about what happens when a minister instructs an official to act outside the 
bounds of the law, both for what officials themselves would do and for what they collectively 
would think about a colleague who did not comply with such an instruction.  
It might be objected that we should distinguish between disobedience of specific rules 
of law and refusals to accept the secondary rules themselves, with only the latter constituting a 
threat to the stability of the legal system. Certainly we should pay particular attention to direct 
refusals to accept the secondary rules themselves, but any disobedience of the law by a senior 
official at the behest of a politician is important. It implies, crucially, the acceptance of an 
extra-constitutional source of authority. 
 
                                                 
27 One argument put to us is that since Hart is a legal positivist who separates law from morality a decision to 
disobey must for him ultimately be solely a moral decision with no further significance. The difficulty is that Hart 
clearly does distinguish between the significance of what officials do and what non-officials do. Another argument 
is that Hart is concerned with the attitude of officials rather than their behaviour. That is true, but what we are 
saying is that one can infer attitudes from disobedience in a way one cannot from obedience. The reasons for 
obedience are many and varied and might not include an acceptance of authority, but the reasons for disobedience 
must include a defiance of authority. 
28 An intermediate possibility is for the official to resign to avoid being personally implicated in the illegality. 
Where such a resignation is ‘noisy’, with the official seeking openly to criticise the illegal order, one should count 
it as displaying the internal point of view. The mere threat of noisy resignation might itself also count as taking 
the internal point of view. ‘Quiet’ resignation, however, which is far more normal in the Civil Service, is slightly 
more difficult to classify, since one can argue that the ‘public standard’ element is missing. On the other hand, the 
meaning of a quiet resignation as criticism will usually be very clear within government and, as in the case of 
Elizabeth Wilmshurst’s quiet resignation as Deputy Legal Adviser to the UK Foreign Office over the legality of 
the Iraq War (see <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/44211/20100126pm-wilmshurst-final.pdf>) that 
meaning will also be clear to the informed public.  




Once the interviews were complete and transcribed, the responses were analysed (by eye, not 
with any assistance of text-analysing software) for similarities and differences. The issue of 
whether two responses are the same or not is clearly one of interpretation about which observers 
might differ. We therefore report as much as we can, within the constraint of maintaining 
anonymity, of what respondents said, so that readers can make their own assessments.  
We initially divide our results into what we found about uniformity in official views of 
rules of recognition, change and adjudication before looking in more detail at uniformity of the 
internal point of view. 
 
IV. The rule of recognition 
It is usually taken as axiomatic that, in the UK, the rule of recognition provides that ‘what the 
Queen in Parliament enacts is law’ (Hart, 2012, p. 107). It is less clear, however, what else one 
might include in the rule of recognition. Hart argued that the existence of the rule of recognition 
was demonstrated when, for example, the courts ‘assert the supremacy of Acts of Parliament 
over other sources or suggested sources of law’ (Hart, 2012, p. 101). Hart, however, at least 
later, also admitted the possibility that a rule of recognition could in principle contain 
substantive elements, for example rules that deny the quality of law to provisions that fail a test 
based on values or law from multiple sources (Hart, 2012, pp. 250-254). It has been established 
elsewhere that the executive has its own sources of normativity (such as minutes, informal 
guidance and letters) which are ‘no less part of our constitutional law’ than statutes (Daintith 
and Page, 1999, p. 398; see also p. 20). Our research therefore concentrated on different, less-
studied aspects of what might be contained within the rule of recognition, such as human rights 
standards and international law. 
In some respects, a uniform view emerged. Just under half of the interviewees expressed 
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views on whether human rights violations, whether in the form of retrospective legislation 
(prompted by discussion of the Poundland case)29 or prisoners denied the vote or hypothetical 
situations such as passing Acts of Attainder, might deprive parliament of the power to make 
law. Twelve clearly supported unlimited parliamentary sovereignty. Even those who expressed 
distaste at, for example, retrospective legislation would remark that parliament was still entitled 
to do what it wanted or that the Human Rights Act 1998 was specifically designed to retain 
parliamentary sovereignty. The only respondent who expressed a view that came close to 
breaking uniformity was a former civil servant who declared, ‘retrospective legislation is 
wrong and dictatorial’. Significantly, however, he prefaced that remark with the phrase ‘as a 
citizen’. As a civil servant, he implied, his job was to uphold parliament’s will.30 
The result was quite different, however, when we looked at what officials thought about 
the status of international law. Is it included in the rule of recognition and, if so, is domestic or 
international law supreme? Our interviews took place before the Ministerial Code was 
amended to remove the explicit mention of the need for Ministers to comply with ‘international 
law and treaty obligations’ – the Code now simply refers to ‘the overarching duty to comply 
with the law’.31 Responses to questions on the status of international law were elicited by 
asking respondents about a celebrated incident involving Admiral Sir Michael (later Lord) 
                                                 
29 R (on the application of Reilly and another) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] EWCA Civ 66 
struck down the Jobseeker’s Allowance (Employment, Skills and Enterprise) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/917, at 
which point the government appeared to owe unpaid jobseekers’ allowance to many thousands of people. It 
refused to pay and induced parliament retrospectively to relieve the government of these debts by means of a 
statute, the Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Act 2013. Subsequently (and after our interviews had taken place) 
a declaration of incompatibility of the 2013 Act was made under the Human Rights Act 1998, s.4 in R (on the 
application of Reilly (No 2) and Hewstone) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] EWHC 2182 
(Admin) and later upheld by the Court of Appeal ([2016] EWCA Civ 413). 
30 On the basis of the type of calculation referred to above, a person whose prior probability for uniformity was 
0.5 and who thought that the type of questions being asked (for example about the Poundland case) would have a 
probability of being answered in a particular way was 0.5, the posterior probability on the basis of 13 positive 
trials is over 0.99. If the prior were as low as 0.2 and the question probability 0.9, the posterior would still be 0.5. 
31 Compare Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code (October 2015) para. 1.2 with earlier versions of the Code. This 
amendment has prompted discussion as to whether the change was merely to save words, as Cabinet Office has 
claimed, or whether that justification ‘stretches credibility’ and masks more insidious reasoning. See, for example, 
M. Elliott, ‘The Ministerial Code and International Law’ <http://publiclawforeveryone.com/2015/10/26/the-
ministerial-code-and-international-law/#more-3283> (last accessed 29 December 2015). 
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Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff (‘CDS’) at the outset of the second Iraq War in 2003 (see 
Chilcot, 2016, section 5 pp. 4, 91, 123, 125-126 and 166).32 Boyce told the Iraq Inquiry (the 
Chilcot Inquiry) that, before committing his troops, he sought reassurance from the Attorney 
General as to the ‘legal base’ of the war.33 Boyce revealed that he was ‘really quite strongly 
against’ taking military action against Iraq.34 In requiring confirmation from the Attorney 
General, he noted specifically that he wanted to ‘pursue a UN route’,35 thus emphasising the 
importance he placed on international law. After the Attorney General published his legal 
advice on 7 March 2003,36 Boyce was still unhappy and asked, on 11 March, for an 
‘unambiguous black-and-white statement saying it would be legal for us to operate if we had 
to’.37 A parliamentary vote on the legality of the war was held on 18 March.38 
Responses were far from uniform as to whether and how parliamentary supremacy was 
affected by international law. The military, without exception, saw international law as a 
superior source of law. One former CDS said that he was ‘bound by international law’ because 
it was the source of his permission to use lethal force. Another former CDS stated that 
international law was what ‘define[d]’ the military. When asked what would happen if 
parliament passed a statute requiring the government to go to war, contrary to international 
law, yet another former CDS hesitated – the idea was clearly inconceivable to him – but then 
                                                 
32 The same example was used by Yong in his empirical study of government lawyers because of the ‘unusual’ 
nature of the incident and, specifically, the unusual fact that the Attorney General’s legal advice was publicly 
available: Yong, 2013, para. 6.1. 
33 The Iraq Inquiry, ‘Request for Witness Statement: Admiral the Lord Boyce’ 
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/51158/Boyce-Statement.pdf> (last accessed 29 December 2015). Even 
revealing the fact that the Attorney General’s advice has been sought, let alone its content, is typically kept 
confidential: see Ministerial Code, above n 31, para. 2.13 and Daintith and Page, 1999, pp. 8, 310. This convention 
stems from the non-accountability of the Attorney General for the advice given: Windsor, 2013, p. 133. The advice 
sought and received regarding the second Iraq War was only the fourth occasion when the Attorney General’s 
advice has been revealed: Yong, 2013, para. 4.11. 
34 The Iraq Inquiry, ‘Evidence of Admiral the Lord Boyce’ 27 January 2011 
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/51818/20110127-Boyce.pdf> (last accessed 29 December 2015) p. 6. 
35 Ibid, p. 9. 
36 Memorandum by the Attorney General to the Prime Minister, ‘Iraq: Resolution 1441’ 7 March 2003 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/28_04_05_attorney_general.pdf> (last accessed 29 December 2015). 
37 ‘Interview: Admiral Sir Michael Boyce’, The Observer, 1 May 2005; Attorney General, ‘Disclosure Statement’ 
25 May 2006, para. 19 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5017872.stm> (last accessed 29 December 2015). 
38 HC Deb vol. 401 cols 760-911 18 March 2003; HL Deb vol. 646 cols 138-232 18 March 2003. 
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he replied: ‘I don’t think it’s possible for parliament to do that. Parliament could pass a Bill, 
but there would be very serious problems if it was contrary to international law.’ One former 
Army General was confused as to why parliament appeared to be unable to get to grips with 
international law, considering that he could ‘get a Private to understand it’.39 
The police and local government chief executives were generally more domestically-
focussed. One former chief constable commented that ‘international law doesn’t really come 
up in UK policing’. Another former chief constable expressed uncertainty, but eventually 
concluded that he thought ‘parliament would have been sufficient authority’. One current local 
authority chief executive was similarly uncertain, but eventually concluded differently: ‘I have 
an underlying value that democracy trumps a lot of things, but I’m not sure how far it trumps 
international law . . . International law feels like the ultimate loyalty in some way as it is 
grounded in common decency’. 
Responses from civil servants were not uniform. One former Permanent Secretary said 
in relation to the Boyce example, ‘it is a serious decision to go to war and so there is an 
assumption it will be based on UN obligations . . . It is a very serious requirement to treat the 
Treaty obligations as if they are the law’. Another former Permanent Secretary said that 
parliament could not ‘do what it likes’ when international law was involved. If parliament 
attempted to ignore international law in something like the Boyce example, he felt that soldiers 
could refuse to fight. Another former Permanent Secretary said, ‘Parliamentary sovereignty is 
one of the cornerstones of our constitutional arrangement’ but went on to say ‘it’s harder if 
you’ve got something where the position looks against international conventions or 
                                                 
39 It has been suggested to us that these military figures failed to understand the chain of command and were 
simply ignorant of the law. The former suggestion is incorrect. They were fully aware of the relevant institutional 
structure, including the role of the Defence Council. They were, after all, in some cases members of these 
institutions. As for the latter, it is true that conventional legal advice would have told them that the UK is a ‘dualist’ 
state in which international law has no domestic effect unless incorporated by domestic law, but, unlike some 
lawyers, the military understands only too well that UK domestic law cannot alter international law and that 
international law is developing in the direction of individual responsibility for people such as senior military 
officers. 
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international law’. Another former Permanent Secretary said that international obligations are 
taken seriously ‘since we believe in the Treaties we sign’.  
A very different view, however, was expressed by other civil servants. Two former 
Permanent Secretaries drew a distinction between international Treaties ‘and what we might 
call vague international law’. The former, because of their specificity, should always be 
followed, whereas the latter was less binding. Another former Permanent Secretary, who 
admitted to being ‘ignorant’ about international law, expressed a similar view in emphatic 
terms. He was scathing about the Foreign Office’s reliance on international law, and especially 
the fact that they ‘seem to have a view that international law takes precedence over our own 
law’. Another former Permanent Secretary noted that while we ‘abide by international law and 
[do] not overrule it, there is no such thing as international law being binding’. He noted that 
his ‘guiding star’ was the sovereignty of parliament and that he had ‘always assumed that 
national law can override international law’ even if ‘you have to jump through a hell of a lot 
of hoops to get there’. 
Perhaps most striking of all was a view expressed by a former civil servant in the course 
of a discussion about the relationship between international law, parliament and the 
government. This respondent was one of the few prepared to criticise Boyce. He did so on the 
basis that the most important organ for deciding what international law required was not a court 
but the Cabinet. His underlying rule of recognition was equally stark: ‘I think that the 
constitution can be changed by the Cabinet.’ That view might be extreme and at odds with 
those of other officials. It is nevertheless consistent with the executive’s long-standing practice 
of adopting its own sources of normativity.40 It amounts, perhaps, to an executive branch 
riposte to the lawyers’ theory that the constitution is a creature of the common law (see e.g. 
Allan, 2013). 
                                                 
40 See above p. 19. 




V. Rules of change 
Rules of change govern how laws are modified, added to or removed (Hart, 2012, pp. 95-96). 
The standard method of such change is ‘legislative enactment and repeal’ (Hart, 2012, p. 95). 
Views were sought as to whether votes or debates in the House of Commons alone sufficed to 
change the law.41 Relevant remarks sometimes flowed from the discussion of the Boyce 
incident. Other respondents were asked about Theresa May’s motion in the House of Commons 
in June 2012:42  
 
‘That this House supports the Government in recognising that the right to respect for family or 
private life in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights is a qualified right and 
agrees that the conditions for migrants to enter or remain in the UK on the basis of their family 
or private life should be those contained in the Immigration Rules.’43 
 
May intended that the motion should influence judicial interpretation of Article 8,44 and the 
motion was unanimously passed. It did not, however, make a big impact on the courts. For 
example, the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Upper Tribunal refused to be bound by 
what it considered a ‘weak form of Parliamentary scrutiny’.45  
 Many respondents agreed that, unlike legislation, parliamentary motions did not change 
the law. One former Permanent Secretary dismissed May’s view that her motion on Article 8 
could alter the law as ‘wishful thinking’. A current civil servant agreed, but added that he 
                                                 
41 Some time after our interviews, the Supreme Court held that ‘A resolution of the House of Commons is an 
important political act … But … A resolution of the House of Commons is not legislation’: R (Miller and Dos 
Santos) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [123]. 
42 18 respondents were asked about this example, predominantly but not exclusively civil servants. 
43 HC Deb vol. 546 cols 760-823 19 June 2012. 
44 T. May, ‘“It is Not for Judges to be Legislators”: Home Secretary’s Public Attack on Rebel Judges’ Mail on 
Sunday, 17 February 2013. For the political context see Laws, 2016 and Featherstone, 2016. May’s political 
problem was that she was blocked by her coalition partners from introducing primary legislation. 
45 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Izuazu [2013] UKUT 45 (IAC) at [49]. 
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doubted whether May really expected to change the law. He surmised that she aimed merely 
to ‘send a message’ and to give ‘political cover’ rather than to influence the judiciary. Other 
than that, he thought, the debate had ‘achieved nothing’. He added that civil servants had 
blocked ‘quite a few’ similar attempts by ministers. Another current civil servant said it would 
make him ‘unhappy’ if a minister tried to change the law in his area by means of a motion 
rather than by legislation. Another former Permanent Secretary expressed his opposition even 
more strongly, arguing that the current trend for ‘less extensive and consultative means’ of 
changing the law was ‘pathetic’. A former CDS was equally hostile, stating that any belief that 
a debate or vote in the Commons could change the law was ‘arrant nonsense’. A former chief 
constable said simply that a parliamentary resolution did ‘not chang[e] the law’. A local 
government figure was similarly succinct in rejecting votes or debates as sources of legal 
change because ‘that’s not how the constitution works’. Two former Permanent Secretaries 
claimed that ministers employ May’s tactic ‘at their peril’, because in their view public opinion 
was generally more favourable to the courts than to politicians, and that a conflict with the 
judiciary not ‘end well for government’.  
Complete uniformity, however, was not achieved. Another current Permanent Secretary 
remarked that although votes and debates did not have the same status as legislation, ‘there is 
a point in trying’ if they might ‘sway’ a court. A former CDS expressed the same view. A 
former Cabinet Secretary thought that ‘judges should take [votes and debates] into account, but 
they should not be bound by [them]’.46 Those views do not challenge the current rules of change 
directly, but they do amount to trying to work around them. One former Permanent Secretary, 
however, went much further, asserting straightforwardly that the Commons motion on Article 
                                                 
46 In this and in what follows in this section, references by officials to ‘judges’ or ‘the judiciary’ are all, in context, 
references to UK domestic judges sitting in domestic courts and not to the judges of the ECtHR.  
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8 should count as having changed the law: ‘If the resolution has been voted on and approved 
by the House and it is clear that they are serious about it then I think judges should follow it’.  
Perhaps the most extreme example of the view that a Commons resolution might change 
the law came in a discussion of what would happen if the courts had ruled unlawful the invasion 
of Iraq despite a Commons resolution in favour of it. A current civil servant queried the 
legitimacy of any such judicial decision: 
 
‘If the judiciary were willing to entertain a case on going to war, the government would 
probably argue that the House of Commons debate had a higher status, but that would be as 
part of a wider discussion on the court having no business in such decisions anyway.’ 
 
This was not merely the conventional point that the courts should defer to the judgement of the 
political branches in matters of national security.47 Rather it was being asserted that if the courts 
fail to defer to the political branches’ primacy, the courts’ view of the rules of change could be 
ignored and the Commons’ view should prevail. 
 
VI. Rules of adjudication 
Rules of adjudication provide a mechanism for determining what the rules require in specific 
cases when disagreement or uncertainty appears (Hart, 2012, pp. 96-98). The function is 
typically performed by judges and courts (Hart, 2012, p. 97). That, indeed, is the view of 
adjudication we found among local government chief executives. They regularly mentioned 
judicial review as one of the main adjudicatory options open to the authority when faced with 
adverse central government decisions, although one chief executive bemoaned the fact that it 
                                                 
47 See eg A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 at [107] and [116] per Lord Hope of 
Craighead and at [29] per Lord Bingham of Cornhill, although nb the limits of deference mentioned by Lord 
Bingham at [44] and also note Lord Hoffmann’s judgment, which famously proceeds on a different basis. 
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was not a popular choice with the public. Another chief executive, when asked how he would 
find out the legal position on an issue, immediately responded that it would be through judicial 
review, especially ‘[i]f something had a real adverse effect on [this area]’. Another current 
chief executive noted that, where the law is unclear, her tactic is usually to ‘take a reasonable 
position and ultimately leave it to the courts’. 
We also found frequent mention of subsidiary or additional methods of determining 
what the law requires, including reference to counsel and consultation among colleagues. One 
former Permanent Secretary noted that he would engage counsel (rather than using his own 
internal lawyers) on ‘sensitive’ issues, but that external advice was not restricted to such issues, 
and was therefore quite common. Daintith and Page noted in the 1990s that the Attorney 
General had issued guidance to curtail the contracting out of legal services (Daintith and Page, 
1999, pp. 213-214), but the situation seems to have changed, possibly because of the continuing 
growth of judicial review (Yong, 2013, paras. 1.1-1.3. See also Windsor, 2013 for other reasons 
this might have happened). 
Consultation among colleagues was also prevalent in all sectors, and particularly within 
the civil service and local government (Yong, 2013, para. 4.6 also noted that informal advice 
from government lawyers was ‘very common’). One former Permanent Secretary was quite 
clear that ‘[w]hat you do when you don’t know what to do is sit down and talk to each other’. 
A current Permanent Secretary agreed, noting that his first point of contact any time he has a 
question or a difficulty are his predecessors. A former Cabinet Secretary remarked that people 
simply talk to one another to ascertain the law and that it was ‘an utterly British way of doing 
it’.48 Similar patterns of using professional and personal networks appeared in the military and 
local government respondents. 
                                                 
48 See also Peter Hennessey’s interviews of Cabinet Secretaries, above n 19. 
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None of this is perhaps particularly different from what happens outside government. 
When we look more closely at central government, however, we find something else, a rival to 
the courts in making adjudications, a rival whose authority goes beyond that of references to 
counsel or informal consultations with colleagues. That rival is the Attorney General. For 
several civil servants and for some of the military, whatever the Attorney General says is law 
is law. As Daintith and Page noted, for many inside Whitehall the description of the Attorney 
General as the government’s chief legal adviser is misleading. As they found, his role is 
‘broader’ than the word ‘adviser’ might suggest, having a ‘special quality and status’ (Daintith 
and Page, 1999, p. 297). A succession of central government figures told us that the Attorney 
determines what the law is.49 For example, one former Permanent Secretary noted that when 
Admiral Boyce wanted to go to the Attorney General, ‘The Attorney General was being asked 
“what is the law”, not “[what is] the likelihood of being sued”’. Another said, ‘The PM and the 
Foreign Secretary must seek the opinion of and obey the law officers.’ Yet another said, 
referring to the legality of the war in Iraq, ‘What if the Attorney General had said it was not 
legal? That would have been it. If it’s not lawful, you can’t instruct an official to do it. You 
can’t instruct me, because if you do, I will not do it.’  
A further perhaps paradoxical indication of the binding nature of the Attorney’s 
determinations was that respondents reported occasions on which the Prime Minister knew he 
would not like the Attorney General’s view and so ‘he made sure not to ask him’. Yong noticed 
a similar process, remarking that the delay in seeking the Attorney General’s advice on the 
second Iraq war was ‘possibly because the Prime Minister feared it would not support his 
chosen course of action’ (Yong, 2013, para. 6.24). Why take active steps to avoid taking the 
                                                 
49 In this respect, the law officers are carrying out a core executive function, namely acting as ‘final arbiters of 
conflicts between different elements of the government machine’: see Rhodes, 2007, p. 1247. But the Prime 
Minister’s ability to avoid asking for a decision is possibly an example of the kind of manoeuvre to be found in 
‘court politics’ – see Bevir and Rhodes, 2016. 
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Attorney’s advice, especially since evasion can itself cause problems,50 unless its effects once 
given are ‘final and determinative’? (Yong, 2013, para. 4.4)51  
There is no uniformity on this point, however. About half of our central government 
respondents made comments that can be interpreted as attributing an adjudicatory role to the 
Attorney General, but the other half did not, most of them indicating support for a mere 
‘advisory’ role.  
Another interesting aspect of the Attorney General’s role is that although central 
government officials did not deny that the courts were entitled to interpret the law, those 
interpretations were not universally and invariably treated as automatically applicable within 
government without further confirmation from the Attorney General. As has been observed 
elsewhere, the Attorney General functions as ‘a buffer’ between politicians and lawyers (Yong, 
2013, para. 4.8). The degree of that buffering can, however go too far for the courts. In 2015, 
in R (Evans) v. Attorney General,52 Lord Neuberger found it necessary to repeat Lord 
Templeman’s condemnation in M v. Home Office53 of ‘the proposition that the executive obey 
the law as a matter of grace and not as a matter of necessity’. We heard what appeared be an 
echo of that proposition when a former Permanent Secretary, on being asked about the effect 
of a European Court of Human Rights decision on prisoner voting, commented that rather than 
complying he would seek the Attorney General’s advice. He suspected that ‘[t]he Attorney 
General will say “I’m afraid you have got to comply”’, but he would be unwilling to comply 
                                                 
50 The Ministerial Code sets out a duty to consult the law officers ‘in good time before the Government is 
committed to critical decisions involving legal considerations’ (Cabinet Office Ministerial Code (October 2015) 
para. 2.10). Daintith and Page, 1999, note the possible ‘intra-governmental … [and] public embarrassment’ of 
failing to seek and obtain the Attorney General’s advice (p. 302). 
51 Yong also notes that other subordinate governmental lawyers’ advice may be viewed as determinative in certain 
circumstances: Yong, 2013, para. 4.22. Cf Daintith and Page, 1999, p. 312, where the hypothetical scenario is 
presented of an Attorney General resigning when his advice is not taken, and Yong, 2013, paras. 6.10-6.13, where 
it is noted that the advice of the Attorney General (and other legal advisers) was not followed in relation to the 
Suez Crisis. The then Attorney General (Manningham-Buller) threatened resignation, but did not ultimately 
resign. 
52 [2015] UKSC 21 at [53]. 
53 [1994] 1 AC 377 at 395. It should be mentioned that the Attorney-General of the day was directly involved in 
the management of this case (personal communication to the authors from one the Home Office’s counsel). 
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immediately without seeking such validation. Admittedly, that example arose in the context of 
a decision by an international court, not the domestic courts involved in Evans and M, and we 
did hear a rival story that although officials often very much resent judicial decisions they 
nevertheless comply without further ado,54 but it at least suggests an area for further 
investigation. The executive preference to keep the courts ‘out of its “own affairs”’ is well 
known,55 but the view condemned by Lord Neuberger and Lord Templeman goes further. It 
treats the courts as an alien force and would help to justify the executive setting up its own rival 
‘insider’ process of adjudication.56  
 
VII. The internal point of view 
The test devised for whether officials maintained an internal point of view was whether there 
were circumstances in which, on political instruction, they would refuse to comply with what 
they knew to be the law.57 Evidence of officials adhering to the internal point of view was not 
                                                 
54 One Permanent Secretary raised deportation cases (particularly the case of Abu Hamza al-Masri), observing 
that such cases ‘show ministers accepting that they’re bound . . . by the court’s interpretation, otherwise they 
would just put people on planes. It causes immense frustration and anger but they don’t ignore the courts’. See 
also Daintith and Page, 1999, pp. 326-330 on the executive’s ‘subservience to the judiciary’. 
55 Daintith and Page, 1999, p. 393. Page, 2001, pp. 72-73 found that civil servants behaved ‘as if the judge were 
there by their side’, though not in a friendly way. 
56 It has been suggested to us that the Attorney’s role in providing adjudication on the law within government 
arises simply as a matter of convenience because the courts will only clarify the law where there is an active 
dispute between a citizen and the state. The problem with this argument is that, because of the generous rules on 
standing operated by the English courts, it is very easy to generate a public law case on which the courts will 
adjudicate. The main practical advantage of adjudication by the Attorney over adjudication by the courts is rather 
secrecy, which is itself an aspect of separation between the executive and the courts. 
57 See above for the justification of this as a test for the internal point of view. Civil servants were specifically 
asked what use (if any) they had made of the written direction procedure, under which civil servants not content 
with a ministerial instruction on grounds of regularity, propriety or value for money ask for the instruction to be 
put in writing. (See Harris, 2013). The responses we received might form the basis of further work on the topic 
itself. Experience varied considerably as to the extent of the use of that procedure during civil servants’ careers. 
One former Permanent Secretary said he had used the procedure twice, and noted that its use ‘needn’t be 
controversial’. Another former Permanent Secretary said that the threat of using the procedure was used 
considerably more than the procedure itself. Yet another former Permanent Secretary, however, described the 
written direction procedure as the ‘nuclear option’ and argued that a Permanent Secretary ‘would be an idiot to 
constantly threaten written direction’. He did note, however, that the procedure was useful in adding ‘formality’ 
to the relationship between Permanent Secretary and minister, and that ‘big politicians’ did not mind its use 
because ‘it shows the buck stops with them’. Another former Permanent Secretary noted that new ministers were 
more likely to be shocked by the use of the procedure, and that one such minister had accused the Permanent 
Secretary of ‘threatening’ him. One of us has personally been a situation in which an accounting officer announced 
an intention to ask for a written direction if a certain course of action were taken and can report that it did indeed 
feel like being threatened or coerced. 
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lacking. Many civil servants indicated that in a situation in which they were being asked to do 
something unlawful they would not comply. The situation was different from one in which they 
had doubts about a policy’s wisdom or value for money, in which they might go along with 
their minister’s wishes or, in extremis, resign. In Page’s research, only two civil servants 
reported an objection to a particular policy they had to implement. They nevertheless thought 
it would be ‘unprofessional’ not to publicly defend the policy as ‘a very good idea’ (Page, 
2001, p. 114). But for several officials, legality was a different matter. One former Permanent 
Secretary told us ‘there is the expectation that the Permanent Secretary sometimes draws lines 
and says he cannot do that’. He remarked, using the Pergau Dam case as an example,58 that he 
did not think he ‘could have been directed to do something illegal or unlawful’.  
Another former Permanent Secretary described as ‘nonsense’ the suggestion that civil 
servants should disagreement on policy and legality in the same way and either comply or 
resign. He explained, ‘if it’s not lawful, you can’t instruct an official to do it’. Two former 
Permanent Secretaries asserted that specifically ‘in matters of war and peace’ resistance to 
illegality was a viable option and that officials did not face the forced choice of complying or 
resigning. 
 The view of the military was similar. One officer drew a line between issues of ‘dubious 
legality’ and proposals he simply disagreed with. With regard to the former, he felt that he 
could refuse to carry out the order. With regard to the latter, however, he felt that the military 
had to ‘either salute and get on with it or, if you wouldn’t be able to live with yourself, you 
resign’. He concluded: ‘The military does not just do whatever it wants. And we don’t just do 
                                                 
58 A grant of over £200 million to build a hydroelectric dam in Malaysia was held unlawful in R v. Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte World Development Movement Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 386. 
The Overseas Development and Co-operation Act 1980, s.1(1) gave the Secretary of State power ‘to furnish any 
person or body with assistance, whether financial, technical or of any other nature’ to promote ‘the development 
or maintaining the economy of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, or the welfare of its people’. 
The grant was ultra vires because it was not made for any of the stated purposes.  
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everything we’re told.’ A former General agreed, saying, ‘as a General, I shouldn’t obey illegal 
orders, so I have every reason to question it. That was taught to me from the beginning.’ 
Local government officials were clearer still that they would refuse to obey unlawful 
orders. One current chief executive said: 
 
‘[Sometimes you have to] stand up and be counted where you can’t be wilfully blind. 
Sometimes you think if no-one else is complaining then it is fine, but there is a tipping point 
where you think “I can’t do this anymore”’. 
 
The legal protection offered to the Head of Paid Service in local authorities gave them some 
basis for that position,59 but they recognised that the practical political consequences of 
defiance might well be a conflict they would in the end lose.60 Chief executives typically noted 
that, ‘if the relationship between the Leader [of the council] and the chief executive goes wrong, 
it’s the chief executive who has to leave, not the Leader.’61 Nevertheless refusal was usually 
seen as correct behaviour.62 Another current chief executive continued: 
 
‘I have been asked a lot of times by politicians to do things and I have refused . . . If you do 
something just because people put pressure on you, you have no integrity. If I fall out with my 
                                                 
59 See R (Lock) v. Leicester City Council [2012] EWHC 2058 (Admin) [29]-[37] for a summary. 
60 Note that the legal protection is not particularly strong. See e.g. R (Lock) v. Leicester City Council [2012] 
EWHC 2058 (Admin) itself, where the Chief Executive’s attempts to use the law to stay in post completely failed.  
61 Readers should note that one of the researchers had personally been a Council Leader with direct personal 
experience of the relationship between the Leader and the Chief Executive of a local authority and that respondents 
might have been influenced by that fact. The statement in the text does however also reflect that researcher’s own 
experience of the legal and political realities of the relationship. Admittedly, sometimes both the Leader and the 
Chief Executive end up leaving, but that hardly counts as a win for the Chief Executive. See e.g. 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1509360/Liverpool-regeneration-project-pair-quit.html> (last 
accessed 1 May 2016). 
62 This view was not universal, however. One current chief executive argued: ‘If I am told to do something and I 
really don’t like it, I’d have to leave.’ Another current chief executive’s views were somewhere in between: ‘My 
instincts are that if the democratic process decides that something should happen, my role is to make it happen 
unless I think there is some sort of problem in making it happen.’ 
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political executive, I am out of it. But I would rather not have a job than do the wrong thing. 
What am I worth if my integrity is not intact?’ 
 
She continued to say that she would not resign under such circumstances: ‘Standing up, not 
resigning, is the right thing to do.’ 
Crucially, however, some civil servants indicated that they would follow a ministerial 
order even if that they knew that order to be unlawful. One former Permanent Secretary said 
he had asked for a ministerial written direction where he was ordered to do something that had 
‘no legal base’. Despite being sure that the action would be struck down if judicially reviewed, 
after receiving a written instruction he was happy to go ahead. It was enough that the minister 
went ‘into it with his eyes open’. Another former Permanent Secretary agreed that a written 
direction was the correct ‘mechanism’ where ‘government is intent on policy which is illegal 
under domestic law’. Having received a written instruction to carry out an illegal order, he was 
quite clear that he would have to ‘either carry it out or resign’. Some police officers also thought 
that they had to follow orders. In relation to the Boyce example, one former chief constable 
noted that regardless of the legality of the war, if Boyce had refused to go to war, it would have 
amounted ‘mutiny’.63 
Such views might be surprising, but they are consistent with the response we recorded 
to the ‘Poundland’ case that some civil servants felt comfortable with refusing to follow a court 
judgment if their minister’s view, having the support of the House of Commons, was that the 
court should be resisted. More generally, a former Permanent Secretary said that it was ‘not 
uncommon that legal advice says the chances of a court striking [the decision] down are high’ 
yet ‘ministerial decisions might still go ahead’, apparently without protest from civil servants.64  
                                                 
63 That view was not universal, however. Two other former chief constables gave examples of incidents where 
they had refused to follow political instructions of doubtful legality. 
64 In Yong’s empirical research, no government lawyers spoke of ministers suggesting deliberately illegal courses 
of action, but several interviewees reported that the lawyers often had to point out that a particular course of action 




VIII. Is there a uniform internal point of view? 
What can we say, bringing the evidence together, about whether UK officials have a uniform 
internal point view of the UK’s rules of recognition, change and adjudication?  
As we laid out above, that question has two parts: are views uniform and are they 
uniformally internal? In some respects, views are uniform. We found very little evidence, for 
example, that UK officials are currently tempted by any substantive restrictions on 
parliamentary supremacy. Whatever the views of certain judges, and whatever the hopes of 
certain theorists, we found only the beginnings of uncertainty and hesitation about the effect of 
the human rights thinking on what counts as law. Both on retrospectivity and on human rights, 
officials turned to a straightforwardly hard positivist view of the supremacy of parliament in 
domestic law.  
In other respects, however, even in our small sample (which itself might be biased 
towards uniformity) official views were very far from uniform. The most striking is the status 
of international law. The military and some officials associated with defence and foreign policy 
tended to say that parliament could not alter or relieve the obligations of international law. 
They felt bound directly by international law regardless of what parliament or the government 
thinks. Other officials distinguished between treaty obligations, which were binding, and 
‘vague’ international law, which was not. Others still distinguished between international law 
about war and peace and other types of international law. In sharp contrast, others, both in 
central government and in local government, believed international law to be entirely 
                                                 
was contrary to European law: Yong, 2013, para. 5.12. His research does not explore in detail whether or how 
frequently legal advice is not followed, except to note that it may not always be followed when it regards the 
prudence, rather than the legality, of a policy: para. 5.25. 
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subordinate to domestic legislation, or even to the democratic will of the House of Commons 
as expressed in a resolution.65  
Lack of uniformity also appeared about adjudication. Outside central government, the 
conventional view holds sway, namely that the courts provide the only authoritative 
interpretations of the law, although there might be other more informal methods that work 
better from day to day. But inside central government, a different theory has supporters, 
according to which the Attorney General gives authoritative interpretations of the law. In an 
extreme variation on that theory, the Cabinet itself, on the advice of the Attorney,66 is taken to 
be the highest interpreter of the law. 
Moreover, the conventional view of the rules of change – that parliament can change 
the law only by means by Acts of Parliament or authorised secondary legislation – is fraying 
at the edges, with support being found for the majoritarian view that whatever the House of 
Commons votes for, even if merely in the form of a resolution, should be capable of changing 
the law. Many still take the older view but strict uniformity does not exist.  
Lack of uniformity is perhaps unsurprising given that, as Daintith and Page observed, 
the autonomy of individual government departments is ‘central’ to our constitution (Daintith 
and Page, 1999, p. 58). That autonomy includes differing departmental attitudes as to when 
and how legal advice is sought (Daintith and Page, 1999, p. 333). Furthermore, Daintith and 
Page found that the Government Legal Service at that point in time lacked ‘co-ordination and 
                                                 
65 It has been suggested to us that we are basing our view that uniformity is lacking on the issue of the relationship 
between international and domestic law on the views of the final interviewee mentioned above at p. 25. That is 
not so. It is based on the lack of uniformity across all officials, with that final official acting as an outrider. It was 
also suggested to us that the officials we interviewed might not have had any contact with issues affected by the 
relationship between international law and domestic law. It is difficult to refute that accusation directly without 
compromising anonymity but in any case, given that the relationship between international and domestic law goes 
to the heart of the effects (in different ways) of both EU and ECHR law on domestic law, we would contend that 
there is no such thing as a government department whose work is unaffected by that relationship.  
66 Although he attends Cabinet, by convention, the Attorney General is not a member of Cabinet. On the 
‘considerable controversy’ on the matter, and the different rule from time-to-time between 1912 and 1928, see 
Daintith and Page, 1999, pp. 235-236. That liminal status reflects a deeper ambiguity about the role: whether they 
are ‘detached professionals’ or ‘full ministerial participants in government’ (p. 234). 
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coherence’, so that the legal advice given was not centralised (Daintith and Page, 1999, p. 322. 
See also Yong, 2013, ch. 2, although it is important to note his comments on attempts to ensure 
‘some consistency and coherence in legal advice across Whitehall’ by way of informal groups 
(executive summary para. 7, ch. 2 and para. 4.14) and his observation that the finality of the 
Attorney General’s advice may provide some consistency (para. 4.4)). But for lack of 
uniformity to break out on a question about which lawyers, as far as we know, would not 
themselves disagree is surprising. 
Moving on to the internal point of view, it is very striking that some senior civil servants 
regard their duty to support their minister as superior to any duty to comply with the law. That 
view seems more common among civil servants than among local government officials, who 
start from a different legal base though not necessarily from a different practical one, and the 
police, though it is not entirely absent even there. It is difficult to see how these officials are 
taking the internal point of view. One cannot even say they are giving a false impression of 
accepting the rules. All they might argue is that their defiance is not public and so not 
necessarily a direct threat to stability. 
 
IX. Implications 
On their face, these results, albeit derived from a small study, seem to suggest that Hart’s 
account is at least seriously incomplete. If we accept that the UK does have a legal system, we 
seem to need more than Hart’s account of what officials believe to explain its persistence. We 
concede, however, that an argument from tolerance might be made in each of the examples we 
have identified. The argument would be that the degree of official disagreement we have found 
about the status of international law, the role of the Attorney General, the status of Commons 
resolutions and on whether civil servants are prepared to break the law does not add up to a 
threat to the operativeness of the legal system. These examples, the tolerance argument would 
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claim, are minor perturbations that pose no threat to the system as a whole. For practical 
purposes, Hart’s theory would remain intact. 
One objection to taking a complacent view is the high salience of the issues associated 
with the areas of lack of uniformity. In particular, the relationship between international law 
and domestic law lies at the heart of a series of immensely important issues in early 21st century 
British politics: the relationship between the UK and the EU, the future of human rights 
legislation and lessons of the second Iraq War. The options a state faces on that relationship 
are no more difficult to grasp than any other issue in elementary constitutional law, but 
disagreement about them potentially affects not only issues of political strategy but also 
everyday decisions about such matters as prisoner voting rights and economic policy.  
Another objection to the complacent view is that although each point taken individually 
might cause only minor ripples in the operativeness of the UK’s legal system, if circumstances 
arose in which they came to be combined, the situation might be far more serious. The Boyce 
situation itself, if it had gone down a different route is a case in point – the clash about the 
status of international law, combined with rulings from the Attorney General possibly at odds 
with rulings from the courts and claims of high authority made for resolutions of the House of 
Commons might easily have produced a situation in which UK armed forces were receiving 
contradictory instructions about going to war and the populace were faced with a military 
denying the principle of civilian control over the armed forces.  
A further point, relating specifically to the results on the internal point of view, is that 
the situation might deteriorate rapidly if the population became more aware of the views of 
some civil servants and police officers that they should sometimes defy the law. The lack of an 
internal point of view would threaten not only their personal credibility but the legitimacy of 
the whole system. 
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X. Questions raised for further research  
The results here are only suggestive. A full-scale study, qualitative and quantitative, difficult 
as that might be to organise, might show that the dissident views we found are held by very 
small minorities and so would not in reality pose much of a threat to the operativeness of the 
legal system. But what if they are not held only by insignificantly small minorities? What 
would be the implications if our findings were replicated at scale? 
One set of implications, and a justification by itself for more research on these 
questions, would concern the compatibility of different directions of change in the secondary 
rules. A move towards incorporating international law into the rule of recognition implies a 
restriction on the legal powers of domestic majorities, but a move towards allowing simple 
resolutions of the Commons to change the law implies an expansion of the powers of domestic 
majorities. Would such changes be contradictory or complementary? They might seem 
politically to be complementary, but legally they look contradictory and a possible source of 
future conflict and instability. Moreover, a movement in favour of majoritarianism in the rules 
of change justified by appeals to democracy might have a knock-on effect on the rule of 
recognition, for if a government can change the law by a resolution of the Commons, what is 
the point of the House of Lords? 
Another set of implications justifying further work is more social scientific. We have 
found some evidence of the existence of a uniform internal point of view but also evidence of 
its absence. If larger studies were to confirm our findings, can we say that Hart was wrong? 
The simple answer to that question seems to be ‘yes’. Hart claimed a wider uniformity than 
seems to exist. But if, following Galligan’s view, we think of Hart’s account as an ideal type, 
the immediate question is whether Hart’s view is so wrong that we should discard it 
completely? We arguably found sufficient uniformity that one might perhaps regard throwing 
Hart’s ideal type out entirely as precipitate. On the Weberian interpretation of Hart, we would 
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need to ask whether we could identify other ideal types, in the sense of analytical constructs 
built out of one-sided accentuations of social practices, capable of explaining the part of social 
reality left unexplained by Hart.  
One possibility is that we might need an ideal type built around an official who acts 
according to political imperatives rather than legal rules. Indeed, some of our officials, those 
who stressed settling constitutional questions by negotiation and mutual adjustment, might 
themselves serve as the basis of such an ideal type.67 From a Hartian point of view, the ideal 
type of the political official represents a form of lawlessness. Many of the civil servants we 
interviewed were indeed candid about their, and their ministers’, distaste for the courts.68 But 
the political official type is more subtle than merely someone who finds the judiciary irksome. 
It involves ‘balance’ and accommodation between law and politics. For example, a former 
Cabinet Secretary revealed that he had organised private meetings between senior colleagues 
and the judiciary with the objective of assisting mutual understanding. His summary of the 
situation was: 
 
‘There has always been tension. The judges quite rightly assert their independence and the 
politicians their sovereignty. But the relationships were not always bad behind the scenes.’69 
 
The political official ideal type, however, is not the only possible further explanation 
that might account for the part of social reality left unexplained by Hart. The evidence suggests 
that officials might not simply reject the rules of recognition, change and adjudication 
conventionally accepted by the courts and by textbook writers. They might also have their own 
                                                 
67 See for example as a source for such an ideal type Peter Hennessey’s interviews with Cabinet Secretaries, above 
n 19. 
68 One former Permanent Secretary said it ‘drives ministers mad’ when judges express a view of the law contrary 
to that of the government. See also above n 54. 
69 He did, however, add, ‘[I]t is much more difficult now with the Human Rights Act . . . There is always a tension 
and there should be; that is healthy. But the degree of heat that builds up behind it should be watched.’ The growth 
in judicial review has been another source of antagonism: Daintith and Page, 1999, p. 339. 
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different rules or at least their own debates about what the rules should be – for example 
whether international law is superior to domestic law, whether Commons resolutions should 
have legal effect, and in case of dispute or uncertainty whether the Attorney General, or even, 
according to a particularly extreme view, the Cabinet, decides what the law is. That suggests 
in turn a different explanation based around not a rejection of strict legality or of government 
through rules but instead a plurality of such rules. It would be as if a legal system exists formed 
around and operated by the courts, but another legal system exists based in government and 
centring on the Attorney General. The two systems would have similar views on many basic 
matters but they might not entirely coincide and might have different degrees of internal 
coherence. The degree of conflict between them would have be managed by their leading 
participants, in particular the Law Officers on one side and the senior judiciary on the other. It 
would still be a matter of ‘balance’ and adjustment, but between different systems of rules 
rather between law and politics. 
 The extent to which a plurality of systems of rules exists within the British state is at 
this stage more a topic for future research than a firm conclusion. One might, however, point 
to a parallel in the relationship between the courts and parliament in the UK. One can see 
parliament as attempting through Article 9 of the Bill of Rights to assert a zone of lawlessness. 
That seems to be the judges’ view of parliamentary privilege.70 A different view, however, is 
that parliament, or at least a group of people within parliament, is asserting that it has its own 
separate legal system – a lex parliamentaria in the literal sense – with its own rules of 
recognition, change and adjudication.71  
 Another direction for future research would be to ask whether the situation in the United 
Kingdom is unique. The idea that state officials might not always be inclined to follow the law 
                                                 
70 See eg R v. Chaytor [2010] UKSC 52. 
71 Roughly: what the House votes for by majority is law, that the House can change any previous rule by majority 
and that (in the Commons) the Speaker adjudicates on disputes about what the law is. 
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might be shocking to those who have built their constitutional theories exclusively on the idea 
the Rechtsstaat, but that by itself does not rule out the possibility. Results similar to those of 
the British case are far from impossible elsewhere, especially in countries (in Scandinavia, for 
example) where the concept of judicial supremacy is not universally accepted. Even where that 
principle is, more or less, accepted, for example in the United States, difficulties surrounding 
locus standi and doctrines limiting justiciability, such as the political question doctrine, leave 
much scope for officials in the other branches of government to conduct themselves in a Hartian 
or in a non-Hartian way.72  
 In the end, it might turn out that to capture the whole range of what is happening, and 
to explain both long term stability and change, we will need both the political official ideal 
type and the idea of competing systems of rules, and that both will supplement rather than 
replace Hart’s ideal type of officials who share the same views and criticise their peers who 
fail to conform. Social reality does not need to be simple.  
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